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FOREWORD
In late 1979, the AICPA Federal Tax Division formed a task force, 
under the direction of the Tax Policy Subcommittee, to study the 
problems of tax revenue losses due to underreported income. The 
objective was to consider the various problems and issues and to pre­
sent recommendations for possible approaches to improve reporting of 
income. This report embodies the results of the task force study.
It is now widely recognized that loss of tax revenue from 
underreported income (also referred to as the compliance gap, the 
underground economy, the hidden economy) is a major problem in the tax 
system. The so-called tax gap is enormous by anyone’s estimate and is 
growing larger. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 
(TEFRA) includes many measures aimed at reducing this revenue loss. 
Some of the possible solutions discussed in this study have been 
adopted in TEFRA; others have not. , This study is offered as a contri­
bution to the ongoing debate about the problem of underreported 
income.
Over two years of dedicated work went into the development of 
this study, and the members of the task force —
Donald H. Skadden, Chairman
John Gilbert
Donald M. Tannenbaum 
Rufus Hardy
have earned the appreciation of the AICPA Federal Tax Division. 
Mr. Skadden’s tireless efforts, in particular, were instrumental in 
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INTRODUCTION
The intentional underpayment of taxes is certainly not a new phe­
nomenon. It has been a common problem since biblical times. The 
scope and magnitude of the problem have varied from time to time and 
from country to country, but underpayment has been a serious concern 
for centuries. The citizens’ attitudes and their inclination to 
underpay can vary from one type of tax to another. For example, 
within the United States the high level of noncompliance with the per­
sonal property tax has caused many jurisdictions either to abolish or
modify that system; however, during this same time span there has been 
a high degree of voluntary compliance with the self-assessed income   
tax.
Since World War II, however, voluntary compliance in the United 
States has deteriorated, and during the past ten or fifteen years this 
unfortunate development has reached serious proportions. Various stud­
ies indicate that the federal tax shortfall due to the underreporting 
of income may be as high as $70 billion to $120 billion. If such 
amounts were collected in full, the federal budget could be balanced 
and/or tax rates could be decreased significantly. This situation 
presents a serious equity issue: The honest taxpayers are bearing an 
ever-increasing burden because of the growing number of citizens who 
are not paying their full tax. This can easily become a self- 
perpetuating cycle. As the honest taxpayers’ burden increases, the 
growing inequity of the situation may convince them that they are 
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paying an unfair share. This, in turn, could motivate more of them to 
join that segment of society that is not paying what the law requires, 
and might ultimately lead to the breakdown of the voluntary compliance 
system itself.
In addition, if the situation continues to worsen, it could lead 
to the disruption of our economy and even to a breakdown in society if 
Congress finds itself unable to raise sufficient revenue. In all 
likelihood, if the situation threatens to approach such proportions, 
Congress will feel compelled to adopt a system quite different from 
the self-assessment system we have enjoyed for so many years.
The Federal Tax Division of the American Institute of CPAs has 
recognized that CPAs have valid reasons to be concerned about this 
situation. Accountants are concerned with the growing inequities 
among citizens and have a professional interest in maintaining the 
viability of the voluntary compliance system.
This report addresses the terminology and scope of the problem, 
the nature of underground income, possible causes of underreporting, 
the situation abroad, public opinion, and possible ways to alleviate 
the problem. An extensive bibliography and a list of references 
include citations to significant articles, books, and special studies 
related to the underground economy.. The parenthetic numbers in the 
text refer to the corresponding items in the list of references..
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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
While it is recognized that underreporting of income will never 
be completely cured, this report suggests several specific actions 
that could help alleviate the inequities and contain the growth of the 
underground economy. The areas of concern, types of recommendations, 
and some of the specific suggestions are outlined below.
Enforcement activities
o The IRS should redirect some of its efforts toward the 
underground economy.
Penalties
o  Current penalties for both civil and criminal fraud 
should be reexamined.
Informational reporting
o Reporting should be extended to include business payments
to corporations, transactions with barter exchanges, auction 
houses, dealers in collectibles, and large currency 
transactions.
o Tax returns should be modified to provide more information 
and to ease matching with informational forms.
Withholding should be required on —
o Business payments to independent contractors.
o Interest and dividend payments. (The government should
bear the administrative burden or the cost thereof.)
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o Taxable pension payments.
o State tax refunds.
Currency reform
o Encouraging the use of checks and credit cards and 
discouraging the use of currency might deter transactions 
that are common to certain facets of the underground 
economy.
Tip income
o A special conference should be held to explore new and 
innovative approaches to this perplexing problem area.
Education programs
o It is probable that some taxpayers underreport income 
because they do not understand that —
The income is taxable.
The risk they are running by underreporting is 
significant.
Their actions have consequences for the economy and 
the country.
o The IRS should expand and improve its educational efforts.
o Some educational efforts would have greater credibility and 
acceptance if provided by groups outside the government.
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Therefore, the AICPA should seek to enlist the support of 
other organizations in an effort to conduct an extensive 
national education program.
9
TERMINOLOGY AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
Several labels have been coined for that part of the economy that 
consists of income concealed from the tax collectors. The most common 
seems to be "underground economy"; authors have also used "subterranean," 
"clandestine," "irregular," and "hidden" economy. The Internal 
Revenue Service has subdivided the area into the "illegal economy" and 
the "informal economy." Illegal describes the underlying transactions 
and includes prostitution, gambling, drugs, extortion, embezzlement, 
and the like. In the informal economy, the activities are legal but 
are not reported properly, or not reported at all, for tax purposes.
The charge to the Task Force was to examine only the informal 
segment of the underground economy to determine how the accounting 
profession could assist in alleviating the problem and what additional 
measures the government or others could take to improve compliance 
with the income tax statutes.
We have not attempted to measure the dollar volume of the 
underground economy. The several studies that undertook that task 
have shown widely varying results, but all of them indicate that the 
problem is serious enough to deserve the attention of CPAs and other 
responsible citizens.
The earliest relevant study was reported in 1977 by Peter M. 
Gutmann, an economist from Baruch College of the City University of 
New York (11, 12, 13). He estimated that approximately $176 billion in 
income was going unreported in 1976, approximately one third of it 
from illegal activities and the other two thirds from the informal 
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economy. Gutmann’s estimates were based on an examination of the 
stock of money (Ml), composed of currency plus demand deposits.
Gutmann stated that from 1937 to 1941 the underground economy was 
small. Using that base period, he found that currency averaged $217 
per $1,000 of demand deposits. Gutmann then determined that by 1976 
■currency in circulation had reached $344 per $l,000 of demand deposits 
(an increase of $127 per $1,000, or 36.9 percent). Gutmann therefore 
inferred that of the $77.8 billion in circulation in 1976, 36.9 per­
cent, or $28.77 billion, was used to fund the underground economy.
The other $49.1 billion of currency in circulation, plus the $226.2 
billion of demand deposits, made up the total money supply in the 
regular, reported economy. The total money supply of $304 billion 
supported a GNP of $1,869 billion. Gutmann therefore concluded that 
the $28.7 billion was supporting an unreported economy of $176 
billion.
Gutmann noted that currency held abroad, or used to store ill- 
gotten wealth, is. not subtracted before estimating the unreported GNP. 
Furthermore, on the basis of the $176 billion generated in the 
underground economy, Gutmann estimated that up to 1.6 million more 
workers may have been employed than were reflected in official 
statistics. In a later study, he revised this estimate to 5 to 6 
million workers who are employed only in the underground economy (10).
Tn 1978 Edgar L. Feige, an economist from the University of 
Wisconsin, estimated the underground economy at $400 billion (7, 8). 
Feige questioned Gutmann’s assumptions relating to the base period 
chosen, an unchanging ratio of currency to demand deposits, the use of 
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currency as the exclusive medium of exchange in the underground econ­
omy, and the same amount of GNP generated by reported and unreported 
dollars. Instead, Feige used the sum of all transactions to estimate 
total macroeconomic activity. The ratio of total transactions (using 
the estimated life of circulating currency) to observed income was 
determined. The ratio for the benchmark year, 1939, was used to esti­
mate GNP without an underground economy. The difference between the 
estimated and actual GNP produced Feige’s approximations of the 
underground economy.
As with Gutmann, some of Feige's assumptions are questionable: 
the choice of an appropriate base year, the assumed nonexistence of an 
underground economy in 1939, the relative income velocity in the 
irregular and regular economies, the estimates of turnover rates of 
demand deposits and currency, and the exclusion of barter transactions 
from the estimates.
Gutmann and Feige used entirely different methodologies, yet each 
estimated that the underground economy was growing two or three times 
faster than the regular economy. Both men revised their estimates in 
1981, raising them to $420 billion and $800 billion, respectively. 
These estimates suggest that as much as 10 to 25 percent of GNP may be 
unreported.
Moreover, since these amounts are excluded from national income 
statistics, it is apparent that many of the widely followed macroeco­
nomic measurements are erroneous, and the judgements based thereon may 
be misleading. Such measurements as national income, GNP, unemployment 
and inflation are seriously misstated, because they do not take into 
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consideration the underground economy. Yet many government and busi­
ness decisions are based upon those numbers, including the automatic 
indexation of social security benefits, many wage contracts, changes 
in the money supply, and various social programs.
In 1979, the IRS published the results of a special study of 1976 
incomes (14). The IRS estimated that individuals had failed to report 
approximately $135 billion of income in 1976. Of this, about $100 
billion was income from legal sources, which should have produced some 
$17 billion of income tax. The report, quite appropriately, pointed 
out that during the same year individuals did report $1.73 trillion of 
income and paid $142 billion in taxes. Thus, it was estimated that in 
1976, 92.6 percent of income from legal sources was reported. The IRS 
estimated the unreported amount of legal income from various sources 
as follows:
- 13 -
Individual Income 1976
(Dollar amounts 
by the IRS.)
are shown at the midpoint of ranges estimated
Billions of Dollars Percent 
UnreportedReported Unreported
Salaries and wages $ 881 $ 24 2.6%
Dividends and income from
subchapter S corporations 25 3.5 12.3
Interest 49 6.5 11.7
Capital gains 19 4 17.4
Self-employment 60 36 37.5
Rents and royalties 6 4.5 42.9
Pensions, annuities, estates,
and trust 27 5 15.6
Other 7 2.5 26.3
Totals $1,074 $ 86 7.4%
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This table indicates that in all categories other than salaries 
and wages, $193 billion was reported, but $62 billion, or 24.3 per­
cent, was not reported. When this 24.3 percent unreported is compared 
to the 2.6 percent of salaries and wages unreported, it is easy to see 
the significant effect of withholding. As would be expected, some of 
the above estimates are more reliable than others. Jerome Kurtz, at 
that time commissioner of internal revenue, indicated to our task 
force that the interest and dividend figures were quite firm, whereas 
the self-employment estimate was rather soft.
These estimates were derived from several data sources. The 
Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) provided information on 
the nature and extent of compliance, using stratified random sampling 
of returns filed. Discriminant analysis was employed to divide tax­
payers into ten classes, each of which had a distinct compliance pro­
file. Selected returns were examined for compliance, and data were 
weighted appropriately to obtain summary statistics. Data on non­
filers were obtained from the Exact Match File (23), which had been 
developed from interviews of 50,000 households. This program was 
directed toward nonfilers having substantial tax due, and thus did not 
include nonfiling taxpayers with smaller incomes. Other information 
from a file on employee compensation permitted estimation of the 
amount of nonfiler wage income. Total income received by individuals 
was compared with total income reported on tax returns using macroeco­
nomic data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
In the previous table, no attempt was made to distinguish between 
underreporting and nonfiling because of the limitations of the data.
15
These sources provided only the beginning points for many of the esti­
mates made in the study. As noted earlier, some types of information 
are more reliable than others. For example, information on income 
subject to withholding is of a higher quality than that on rents and 
royalties.
Some preliminary figures on the "Gross Tax Gap" were released in 
March 1982 as part of Commissioner Roscoe Egger's statement before the 
Senate Finance Committee's Subcommittee on Oversight of the Internal 
Revenue Service. These figures are included here to illustrate the 
growth in the underground economy. It should be noted that these 1982 
figures report unpaid taxes, whereas the 1976 table reflects unreported 
income. The 1982 report covers income tax only and does not include 
social security or unemployment taxes, which would undoubtedly be 
large amounts. The 1982 study also covers the illegal sector for 
which the estimated tax gap was in the range of $6.1 billion to $9.8 
billion in 1981.
Some reports issued during the fall of 1982 indicated that the 
earlier measures of the informal economy might have been substantially 
overstated. However, as stated before, we have not attempted to 
measure the magnitude of the underground economy nor do we endorse the 
methodologies or results of any of the studies. All of the studies 
indicate that this is a serious problem that needs prompt attention.
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Gross Tax Gap From Individual Income Tax Returns Filed, Nonfilers, and 
Corporate Tax, Tax Years 1973, 1976, 1979, and 1981
Amount of Tax Gap 
(Billions of Dollars)
Note: Details may not add to totals because of rounding.
1981 1979 1976 1973
Individual Tax
Tax loss from underreported income:
Wages $ 2.5 $ 1.8 $ .7 $ .6
Tips 2.3 1.7 1.4 .9
Dividends 3.6 3.1 1.5 .9
Interest 4.1 2.9 1.3 .9
Capital gains 9.1 8.5 5.1 2.0
Nonfarm business 26.2 17.5 11.6 9.6
Farm business 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.5
Pensions 2.8 2.3 1.1 .7
Rents 1.5 1.2 .6 .4
Royalties 1.3 .8 .4 .1
Partnerships 5.5 3.1 2.5 1.5
Estates and trusts .5 .4 .3 .2
Small business corporations 1.7 1.2 1.2 .4
State income tax refunds .4 .3 .1 .1
Alimony .1 * * *
Other 3.1 2.4 1.0 .6
$66.1 $49.0 $30.6 $20.5
Tax loss from overstated deductions,
and credits** $12.3 $ 9.4 $ 6.2 $ 4.8
Nonfilers** 4.9 3.4 2.2 1.2
Total individual tax gap $83.3 $61.8 $39.0 $26.5
Corporate Tax** 3.9 4.7 3.6 2.8
Total tax gap from legal sector $87.2 $66.5 $42.6 $29.3
*Less than $100 million
**These are preliminary IRS figures and have not been reviewed by the
Office of Tax Analysis.
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THE NATURE OF UNDERGROUND INCOME
It is clear that some types of income are more easily understated 
or omitted from a tax return than others. Thus, the underground econ­
omy thrives on income not subject to withholding or to informational 
reporting. Currency transactions are easier to hide from the tax 
collector than business conducted with checks. Both currency and 
checks are more susceptible to underreporting than are credit card 
transactions. Barter transactions bypass all records—currency, 
checks, and credit cards—and are the most difficult to detect.
A barrage of articles in the popular media have identified a wide 
variety of underground activities, ranging from the very small to the 
very large, such as—
o Skimming, including businesses that simply fail to record some 
of their cash sales, cab drivers who leave a few fares off the 
trip sheet, and merchants who take home television sets and 
write them off as shoplifting.
o Tips that are pocketed tax-free.
o Domestic help paid in currency.
o Wage earners who moonlight in second jobs and are paid in 
currency.
o Building tradesmen or auto mechanics who do extra jobs on 
their own time.
o Professionals who exchange services.
o Business travelers who "pad" expense accounts and do not 
report reimbursements as income.
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o Unemployed workers or social security retirees who do odd jobs 
for cash while drawing benefits.
o Taxable use of business property and other taxable perquisites 
of business executives.
o Income that is paid directly into a foreign bank account.
o Garage sales and flea markets.
o Arts and crafts sold by the maker.
o  Exchanges of goods or services through one of the many barter 
clubs or barter exchanges that have sprung up in recent years.
A number of articles in the popular media reveal a lack of 
understanding of the tax law and the tax system. Some writers fail to 
distinguish tax avoidance from tax evasion. They appear to condemn 
all wealthy taxpayers and businesses who avail themselves of the tax 
incentives intended by Congress to encourage precisely those activ­
ities in which the businesses are engaged. A Washington Post article, 
(18) included as an underground activity any business incorporated in 
a Caribbean tax haven to avoid U.S. taxes. While such articles may 
be inappropriate and unfair, they may indicate a public perception 
that is nurturing the underground economy. The belief that big busi­
nesses and the wealthy are avoiding taxes may influence individuals to 
rationalize their own do-it-yourself tax loopholes.
Some of the underground activities listed previously can produce 
cash with little or no taxable income. For example, garage sales are 
often mentioned as part of the underground economy; however, the sale 
of furniture, clothing, and other household items seldom gives rise to 
a recognized gain. Other than relatively valuable items—such as 
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jewelry, sterling silverware, antiques, or art objects—few personal 
assets are likely to be sold for a price in excess of their original 
cost. Even in underground sales where the transaction is of a taxable 
nature, the taxable income is not the full cash received but only the 
excess over the adjusted basis of the property sold. While the sale 
of certain items may result in taxable gain, the sale of others may 
result in nondeductible losses. This generates a perception of 
unfairness that may cause some gains to go unreported.
Another segment of the underground economy that may not generate 
much taxable income includes part-time work and work for very low 
wages. The allowable exemptions and the standard deduction have 
increased the tax threshold to a point where much of the income from 
part-time student help, domestic workers, migrant workers and other 
farm employees, and many tips would not create a tax liability. The 
underreporting of such income is not to be condoned, but its impor­
tance must be viewed in perspective to the total underground economy. 
This is not to suggest that all small amounts be ignored. Small 
amounts on many returns can add up to significant revenue losses for 
the government.
Bartering
Bartering presents especially troublesome enforcement problems 
and may be one of the most rapidly growing areas in the underground 
economy. It covers a wide range of transactions—from neighbors 
exchanging baby-sitting or other favors, to doctors and dentists 
trading their professional services, to airlines exchanging otherwise 
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unused spaces on planes for otherwise unused rooms in hotel chains. A 
relatively new phenomenon, the barter exchange allows individuals or 
corporations to provide merchandise or render services in exchange for 
bookkeeping credits. Those credits can be used at a later time to 
obtain any of a wide variety of goods or services advertised in the 
barter exchange catalog.
Bartering presents economic and accounting issues, as well as 
income tax problems. There are unresolved questions about the defini­
tion of income and about timing and valuation. Services exchanged 
among family, friends, and neighbors are probably gifts and therefore 
not subject to tax. In a direct exchange, the timing is certain 
although the valuation may not be. The Internal Revenue Code stipu­
lates that income received in a form other than cash is to be reported 
at fair market value. But, this is often difficult to apply. What is 
the fair market value of a large block of otherwise unused space on 
several hundred airline flights? In a direct exchange between two 
parties, the valuation problem is often somewhat alleviated because 
value may be more readily apparent on one side of the transaction than 
on the other. However, the organized barter exchanges may exacerbate 
the valuation problem by postponing one side of the transaction.
Transactions through a third-party barter exchange also give rise 
to some technical timing problems. The basic question is whether gain 
should be recognized for tax purposes when credits are received from 
the barter exchange or at some later date when actual goods or ser­
vices are received for those credits. An accrual-basis taxpayer would 
report income at the time the services are rendered or the merchandise 
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delivered. A cash-basis taxpayer, on the other hand, might reasonably 
expect to report income when goods or services are received. It is 
not certain that barter credits will ever be exchanged for goods or 
services, and typically there is no provision for refund for unused 
credits. Nevertheless, the IRS has ruled that barter exchange tran­
sactions are taxable at fair market value at the time that goods or 
services are rendered in exchange for credits (19).
22
POSSIBLE CAUSES OF UNDERREPORTING
By definition, the underground economy is susceptible neither to 
precise measurement nor to definitive analysis. Although it is dif­
ficult to discern exactly why more and more people are participating 
in the underground economy, several contributing factors can be iden­
tified.
1. The combination of high tax rates and high inflation can 
cause taxpayers to find themselves with a lower real income, 
yet a higher tax bill. Otherwise law-abiding taxpayers may 
reason that their tax burden has risen above their "fair 
share."
2. The increasing complexity of the tax law can erode public 
confidence that the tax law is treating everyone fairly. The 
uneasy, perhaps even subconscious, feeling that others are 
escaping tax can be used as a rationalization for cutting a 
few corners.
3. Closely related to, and a substantial cause of, the complex 
tax law is the use of the Internal Revenue Code to motivate 
or impede certain social and economic activities. What 
Congress intends as a tax incentive may be perceived as a tax 
loophole by some who are not in a position to utilize that par­
ticular provision. The perception that Congress is inten­
tionally allowing wealthy taxpayers and big business to 
escape taxes legally can be a strong motivation for others to 
create their own tax savings.
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4. The increasing media attention to this problem may turn into 
a self-fulfilling prophecy. It becomes easier to rationalize 
tax cheating on the grounds that "everyone else is doing it."
5. The changes in social mores and general morality that have 
been evident in many walks of life also have had an impact in 
the tax arena. Many people seem to have less confidence in, 
and respect for, many of society’s, institutions, including 
government, the church, unive , big business, and big 
labor. There is a growing feeling that it is acceptable to 
ignore "unfair" laws...
rsities
6. There is a growing perception that the IRS enforcement prac­
tices are applied in an unevent and inequitable fashion, 
whereby low— and middle-income taxpayers are. harassed over 
small amounts, while insufficient attention is paid to the 
wealthy and especially to nonfilers.
7. Increasing government rules and regulations and payroll taxes 
provide motivation for many businesses to. keep employees off. 
the books.
8. A perception—whether correct or not—of widespread waste and 
inefficiencies in government is often used by some to justify 
their underreporting.
9. There may well be a lack of understanding on the part of
many taxpayers as to —
o The fact that underground types- of income are taxable.
o The risk involved in the failure to report fully.
o The serious impact the underground economy can have upon 
society in general.
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EXPERIENCE ABROAD
The underground economy is not a phenomenon exclusive to the 
United States. It seems to thrive in many, perhaps all countries, 
regardless of their political or economic systems.
The largest underground economy is believed to be Italy's 
1'economia submersa, which has been estimated at 30 to 35 percent of 
the regular economy, or $43 billion (3). Feige states that the 
underground economy is smaller in Scandinavian countries, where there 
is a "social contract" between the government and the citizens, than 
in Italy, where "respect for authority has been crumbling for 
centuries" (7). Nevertheless, Sweden is estimated to have a secret 
economy equal to 10 percent of the national product and a loss of tax 
revenue equal to 15 percent of the budget (3).
France’s travail au noir, may constitute 25 percent of the offi­
cial economy. West Germany's Schwarzarbeit may equal $25 billion in 
untaxed labor income and $4 billion in lost tax revenues, in addition 
to uncollected payroll taxes. Britain's fiddling was estimated to be 
7 to 8 percent of the national output in 1979, but may now be as much 
as 15 percent. Less than 10 percent of Thailand's 19 million workers 
file tax returns, and up to 40 percent of all Argentine business is 
involved with morocho, or the black money market (3, 17). These sta­
tistics indicate that the underground economies abroad are at least as 
large as in the United States. The problem in Europe has been deemed 
serious enough for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) to authorize a study of the legal and administra­
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tive provisions pertaining to tax avoidance and evasion in member 
countries (16).
The reasons given for emergence of sizeable underground movements 
abroad include —
o High tax rates or steeply progressive tax schedules.
o The combination of high tax rates, budget deficits, and 
inflationary pressures.
o The high percentage of cash transactions. (One half of 
Britain’s labor force is paid in cash.)
o The large percentage of workers in agriculture, an activity 
that traditionally has been kept off the books. (Extensive 
moonlighting has been a tradition in France.)
o Deep distrust of government.
o Government inefficiency.
o High labor costs, which encourage firms to keep employees off 
the books to avoid payroll and unemployment taxes.
o Honest businessmen's feelings that they must join the 
underground in order to remain competitive.
The number of workers engaged in moonlighting and regular jobs 
kept off the books continues to expand as individuals and firms 
struggle to meet inflated costs of living and business expenses. 
Perhaps 5 percent of Europe's labor force and one third of Italy's 
(65 percent of the government employees and teachers) are involved in 
secret employment (3, 22). Because of the minimal and inconspicuous 
capital requirements, many home and personal services are provided by 
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moonlighters. It is estimated that one out of eight Britons earns as 
much as $2,200 per year from moonlighting, yet efforts to control 
moonlighting have been unsuccessful in Britain. The same problem has 
been observed in Belgium, France, and elsewhere.
Even if income is stated accurately, expenses may be overstated 
or even fictitious. Sales-type levies are often evaded, particularly 
the value-added taxes, which are "easy to evade, despite myths to the 
contrary" (17).
Perquisites are considered to be part of the "black economy" in 
Britain, where consultants may be paid in claret, and a large percen­
tage of the automobiles are owned by firms and valued at only one 
third of what an independent appraisal would suggest for purposes of 
imputing income (6). "Friendship prices" and under-the-table 
exchanges flourish from Thailand to France, as well as in Britain. In 
Japan, "backdoor admission fees" are paid to universities, and enter­
tainment establishments increasingly evade taxes. In the USSR, the 
second economy is composed of private producers who must pay bribes to 
facilitate production of goods and services unavailable from the state 
(9, 21). The diamond industry successfully evades taxes at all levels 
of production in many countries (2).
Control measures are largely unsuccessful, but France has 
launched a publicity drive against unlicensed house painters and arti­
sans. Britain has tried to fine construction firms using unregistered 
workers, but fines have not successfully curbed this practice (3).
It has been suggested that less government supervision and involvement 
are desirable, that self-policing through VAT and household deductions 
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for repairs (against imputed income of owner-occupancy) be used, that 
as much activity as possible be legalized, and that business and 
employment costs be kept as low as possible (2, 15). Tax treaties 
should be designed to curb transfers between countries that might 
result in evasion of tax.
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PUBLIC OPINION
There have been several interesting studies of public opinion 
about the underground economy and tax cheating in general. A Roper 
study (20) found that a belief that tax cheating is widespread is a 
stronger motivation for people to engage in bartering than is a belief 
that taxes are too high. A study conducted for the IRS by CSR, Inc. 
(4) found that only 13 to 14 percent of the respondents report having 
interacted with the underground economy , and, no more than 17 percent 
agree with statements that tax cheating, is acceptable. However, 27 
percent admitted to being less than completely honest, and 9.1 percent 
stretched the truth a little in filing their 1973 tax returns.
In ranking the relative severity of various crimes, only 58 per­
cent. thought that stealing;. $500 from the government in taxes was "very 
serious," compared to 711 percent who thought it a very/serious crime 
to steal $500 in cash from an employer, 69 percent who would not ille­
gally obtain.$500 in food stamps or welfare payments, and 62 percent 
who would not countenance stealing $500 from a giant corporation (4).
In Britain, only 31 percent of those questioned thought it was 
wrong to avoid tax on income earned in one’s spare time (17). A 
Westat, Inc., study (5) found that non compliance in the United States 
is also greater on secondary sources of income. Dollars withheld from 
the principal salary are considered to be the government’s share, 
while dollars received from a second job or from a hobby in which the 
taxpayer invests time, material, and labor are regarded by many as 
nontaxable.
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WAYS TO ALLEVIATE THE GROWING PROBLEM
While the underground economy is not susceptible to close scru­
tiny and detailed analysis, several things can be done to help alle­
viate the situation. It does seem clear that there is no single 
"quick fix." It is also unlikely that any two or three minor adjust­
ments will make significant inroads on the problem. Real progress 
will require the coordinated efforts of Congress, the IRS, and other 
government agencies, and perhaps a major assist from the private sec­
tor. Attempts to educate the general public and reduce its 
willingness to participate in the underground economy will be more 
effective if they are initiated and conducted by nongovernmental 
groups.
Two general strategies have been suggested from time to time as 
possible solutions. Some say that more and better enforcement by the 
IRS is all that is needed. Others suggest that simply lowering the 
tax rates will substantially mitigate the problem. While both may be 
helpful, it is doubtful that either is a panacea.
Although the consensus both here and abroad is that high tax 
rates are a major contributing factor in the growth of the underground 
economy, it does not necessarily follow that reducing tax rates will 
cause the problem to disappear. Individuals who were motivated to 
find creative ways to avoid 70 percent tax rates may well continue 
those activities to avoid 50 percent tax rates. The underground econ­
omy seems to thrive in most countries around the world, regardless of 
whether their tax rates are higher or lower than ours.
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Enforcement Activities
The IRS has estimated that a revenue agent can produce as much as 
$20 for every $1 of cost. More and better enforcement is, undoubt­
edly, needed and desirable. However, no one knows or can predict the 
level of enforcement that would be necessary to change the underground 
situation appreciably; and even if it were known, it is not certain 
that the IRS could attract enough good professionals to reach that 
level of enforcement, given the existing shortage of such individuals. 
Given the trend toward earlier retirement ages, the IRS should con­
sider recently retired CPAs and other business executives as a new 
source of qualified personnel. However, it is important to consider 
what level of government surveillance and investigation the American 
society is willing to accept. At what point might the cure become 
more oppressive than the disease?
The IRS can improve its effectiveness by reallocating some of its 
present enforcement personnel and efforts. Many tax practitioners 
around the country feel that too much time and effort are being 
devoted to unproductive trivia when they could be applied to the 
underground economy. Even with improved efficiency, however, it seems 
apparent that the IRS will need additional personnel if it is to have 
much impact on the underground economy.
As one step, Congress should authorize additional resources for 
the IRS with the mandate that these resources be used on the 
underground economy. While the mood of the country today seems to 
favor smaller federal budgets and less government interference, it is 
likely that the large majority of citizens who are filing properly 
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would welcome increased surveillance of those who are underreporting. 
Although reduced federal spending may be generally desirable, an 
increase in the IRS’s budget will normally produce a reduction in the 
federal deficit.
Penalties
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 increases the penalties for 
failure to file informational returns from $1 per return and a $1/000 
maximum to $10 per return and a $25,000 maximum. This is an important 
step in the right direction, but we also recommend the following 
changes in penalties. For more than twenty years, the maximum penalty 
for criminal fraud has been $10,000 per count. Whatever deterrent value 
this provision may originally have had has seriously eroded due to the 
declining value of the dollar. The $10,000 amount should at least be 
adjusted for inflation. The penalty for civil fraud should be changed 
from 50 percent of the total tax due to 100 percent of the tax due on 
the fraudulently treated items.
Many years ago, certain penalties were waived for individuals who 
voluntarily corrected prior underpayments. The state of Illinois 
proclaimed a two-week moratorium from December 28, 1981 through 
January 8, 1982 during which time criminal penalties were waived for 
taxpayers who voluntarily paid back taxes (1). Such payments were 
still subject to interest and civil penalties. It has been suggested 
that taxpayers who availed themselves of the Illinois moratorium may 
have created problems for themselves at the federal level. The 
Treasury Department should consider cooperating with states in a 
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program to encourage voluntary catching up." It might be more effec­
tive to waive both criminal and civil penalties in such cases, but it 
does seem reasonable that interest continue to be charged. To the 
extent that the government already waives penalties in instances of 
voluntary disclosures, this policy should be publicized.
Informational Reporting
History has shown that the level of compliance improves when the 
individual knows that the IRS has, or will have, information about the 
transaction or activity. The IRS receives information from a variety 
of sources, including the various Form 1099s; informational schedules 
on tax returns, such as the partnership and the subchapter S schedule 
Ks; and answers to questions on the many types of tax returns.
Presently, anyone in a trade or business is required to file a 
Form 1099NEC for certain types of payments in excess of $600, but only 
if those payments are made to individuals. Such reporting should be 
extended to include payments made by businesses to corporations, since 
many individuals and other small businesses have incorporated in 
recent years. If this produces an unwieldy flood of paper to the IRS 
or an unreasonable burden on the business community, a higher 
threshold might be adopted. For some time, copies of all 1099s have 
been supplied to the government but not necessarily to the recipient of 
the payment. ERTA now requires copies to be supplied to the recipient 
as well, as is presently required for 1099s filed for interest and 
dividend payments. If the taxpayer is aware that a Form 1099 has been 
filed, he is more likely to declare the payment as taxable income.
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It is impractical and unreasonable to require taxpayers to attach 
copies of all 1099s to the tax return, as presently required for W-2 
withholding statements and interest and dividend receipts that exceed 
a certain threshold. However, the $600-type payments usually are 
included in a gross income figure so that any matching by the IRS is 
virtually impossible. Requiring a list of such payments in excess of 
some reasonable threshold would be one possible means of facilitating 
such matching. At the very least, the total of all 1099s received 
should be reported as a separate item on the tax return.
California has adopted a requirement that anyone claiming a rent 
credit on the state income tax return must provide the name and 
address of the landlord. The federal government has a somewhat simi­
lar requirement for taxpayers claiming a credit for child or dependent 
care. This requirement should be extended to include other credits, 
such as the energy credit, for payments above a reasonable threshold.
The Federal Reserve Board requires that banks report certain 
large deposits or withdrawals of cash, but it is our understanding 
that this requirement is generally ignored. The tax authorities 
should either initiate their own reporting requirement or prevail upon 
the Federal Reserve Board to enforce the current requirement more 
vigorously. All businesses should be required to report cash transac­
tions in excess of some reasonable threshold, such as $3,000 or 
$5,000.
States should be required to provide the federal government and 
the taxpayer with an informational 1099 on refunds of state taxes.
A system should be devised for reporting by the organized 
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bartering exchanges. They might be required to report all of the credits 
issued to their members, or to report all transactions above a certain 
threshold. Similarly, some of the typically cash businesses such as 
auction houses, art galleries, and dealers in collectibles and rare 
metals might be required to report cash transactions above a reason­
able threshold.
Several factors of informational reporting must be considered. 
The benefits are both real and psychological; real in the sense that 
the matching process can reveal the underreporting of income, and 
psychological in the sense that the taxpayer who knows that an item 
has been reported to the IRS is more likely to include it on the 1040. 
Both benefits are reduced, however, if the IRS does not have suf­
ficient manpower to match and follow up on the information received.
Withholding
As indicated by the 1979 IRS study (14), the level of voluntary 
compliance is greatest when tax has been withheld at the source. That 
study also confirmed that the level of compliance is quite poor for 
self-employment income. An important portion of such income is earned 
by independent contractors. In 1979 the Executive Committee of the 
AICPA Tax Division "approved support of the concept of withholding tax 
from payments to independent contractors, subject to limitations and 
exemptions no less extensive than those recommended at that time by 
the Treasury Department" (Minutes, Federal Tax Division Executive 
Committee, July 17, 1979). This 1979 action was related to the 
question of differentiating and defining employees and independent 
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contractors. However, such withholding could raise the level of tax 
reporting by independent contractors. In February 1982, the Federal 
Tax Division Executive Committee endorsed the concept of withholding 
on business payments to independent contractors, with two important 
caveats. It does not seem feasible to expect withholding by individ­
ual households; thus, this requirement would not apply to activities 
such as home repairs. Secondly, it must be recognized that a payment 
to an independent contractor becomes a part of gross income, whereas 
the eventual tax liability is computed on net income. Therefore, the 
withholding rate should be kept quite low—perhaps 3 to 5 percent. 
Even at a relatively low level, the withholding would be an important 
factor in assuring that the contractor will include the payment in 
reported income.
It has often been recommended that interest arid dividend payments 
should be subject to withholding. If the level of compliance could be 
raised to that achieved on salaries and wages, the government would 
collect some $2 billion to $4 billion more in income taxes based on 
the 1979 IRS study (14). In addition to this increased revenue, such
t
withholding might be an important factor in improving the image of 
equity in the tax law, since many wage earners feel that investors 
also should be subject to withholding.
Withholding on interest and dividends has been discussed exten­
sively and has been considered seriously by Congress from time to 
time. Strong objections are raised—primarily on the grounds that it 
would be unfair to those who will not owe as much tax as is withheld. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that those individuals will be required to 
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wait up to eighteen months to get a refund of the over-withheld tax.
Some proposals attempt to overcome this problem by providing that 
low-income individuals and exempt organizations could file a statement 
with each company indicating that less tax should be withheld. This 
procedure would overcome the first objection, but would impose serious 
administrative burdens on both the payors and the. payees. The payee 
would need to file a certificate with every payor—perhaps ten, 
twenty, or more corporations. New forms would have to be filed for 
every new investment, even for those that might be in place for a few 
weeks or a few days. . Payors would be required to match these forms 
with the investors’ names and to withhold at varying rates for dif­
ferent payees. Thus, we reject, as unreasonable and unworkable, any 
graduated withholding system for interest and dividends similar to the 
system presently in place for wages and salaries.
We do agree that in the interests of equity and maintaining the 
federal revenue, some form of withholding on interest and dividends is 
desirable.. Innovative thinking is needed to find a system that can 
minimize the administrative burdens on both payor and payee and also 
minimize any economic hardship on the payees. It would be helpful if 
Congress and the major groups of payors and payees would work toward 
devising a viable system rather than simply objecting to any 
suggestion of withholding. We recommend that various approaches such 
as the following be studied and tested.
One system would shift almost all. of the administrative burden to 
the IRS. A flat rate specified by Congress, perhaps 5 to 10 percent, 
would be withheld by every payor from all dividends and interest.
3.7
Eligible individuals and exempt organizations would need to file only 
one exemption certificate—with the IRS. The IRS would then refund 
the appropriate amounts on a quarterly basis. In essence, this would 
entail a deferral of 5 to 10 percent of interest and dividends for 
three to six months by those who would not owe the full 5 to 10 per­
cent tax. After the initial deferral period, the level of income 
would be approximately the same as if there were no withholding. This 
would add a considerable burden to the administrative duties of the
IRS, but it would be less than the total burden otherwise borne by the
 millions of payors and payees.
While the above suggestion should correct the major problems of a 
comprehensive graduated withholding system, it would create new 
problems, such as—
o The IRS would get a single exemption certificate from each 
payee but would have to match that with reports from payors 
in several different IRS regions. A quarterly refund may not 
be feasible.
o If the IRS did refund any excess withholding during the year, 
the investor would still receive a report from each payor at 
the end of the year indicating that tax had been withheld. 
All of this withheld tax would not yet have been refunded, 
and the taxpayer might be confused as to whether a credit 
should be claimed on the 1040 for some or all of the withholding.
If the flat rate withholding is held to a relatively low
level—say 5 percent—refunds may be due to only a small proportion of 
investors. It might be reasonable to ask those investors to wait 
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until the end of the year to get their refunds on the basis of the 
regular filing. This suggests at least two additional plans for 
consideration:
1. Withhold 5 percent from all dividends and all business 
interest payments and provide refunds at the end of the 
year to exempt organizations and to those payees who owe 
less than the 5 percent tax.
2. Allow exempt organizations to file exemption certificates 
with each payor who would then withhold the flat 5 percent 
from all other dividend and interest payments. Refunds would 
be at the end of the year.
In any system that provides for refunds after the end of the 
year, it might be feasible to require the government to pay interest 
from the end of the year in order to help alleviate any financial bur­
den on the payees. A 5 percent flat-rate withholding should obviate 
one of the perceived administrative hardships. The taxpayers should 
not be required to attach withholding certificates. A listing of all 
interest and dividends should be sufficient.
If a viable system cannot be found to substantially reduce the 
administrative costs to the payors, another approach might be to allow 
the payors a tax credit to offset some or all of those costs.
If an acceptable comprehensive withholding system cannot be 
found, the IRS might identify particularly troublesome situations and 
impose withholding only in those areas. For example, if compliance is 
especially poor on taxable coupon bonds, income tax could be withheld 
from those interest payments. Institutions presently apply with­
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holding on a selective basis (such as on nonresident aliens) and 
should be able to apply it to specific types of bond issues.
In February 1982, the Executive Committee of the AICPA Federal 
Tax Division endorsed the concept of withholding at the source of 
interest and dividend payments provided that either the administrative 
burden be shifted to the government or the cost of such withholding be 
borne by the government.
Tips are another source of income that is seriously underre­
ported. The IRS estimates that only about 16 percent of tip income is 
reported. The IRS has made many studies and has estimated the normal 
percentage of tip income in various types of establishments. These 
estimates have been accepted and upheld by the courts in several 
cases. However, even with these successful efforts, it seems clear 
that the usual enforcement techniques are not likely to be economi­
cally viable due to the large number of individuals involved and the 
relatively low amount of tax per individual.
Various approaches used in the past have not been effective from 
an enforcement point of view. Other methods that have been proposed 
from time to time have been subjected to severe criticism from the 
businesses and the employees who would be affected. If the various 
interested parties could be brought together to explore some innova­
tive ideas, perhaps a mutually agreeable solution could be found. It 
would seem preferable for such a meeting to be sponsored by an organi­
zation that is not directly involved in the issue.
As an independent party, the AICPA Federal Taxation Division 
should invite representatives of the various industries and employee 
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groups to come together to find an acceptable approach. These 
interested parties should come realizing that this is a serious 
problem for which a solution must be found. The group should explore 
any and all approaches to the problem. New and innovative ideas are 
needed. Two such ideas that should be explored are suggested here, 
but all parties should attempt to come up with as many others as 
possible.
A low, flat rate tax could be collected from hotels, restaurants, 
airports, or other establishments where tips are common. The 
establishments could then be authorized to withhold or otherwise 
collect the appropriate amounts from the employees.
The income of establishments could be grossed up to include the 
estimated tip income of the employees. A deduction would be 
allowed for the amounts reported as employee compensation. This 
approach also might incorporate a withholding mechanism.
The IRS 1982 study shows that the tax gap on pension income is 
growing much more rapidly than the total gap. This trend is likely to 
continue as larger numbers of taxpayers receive pensions from a larger 
number of plans. This is a confusing area for many taxpayers because 
social security is tax-free, and varying amounts of many other pen­
sions represent tax-free return of capital, while many pensions are 
100 percent taxable.
Presently, pensions are subject to informational reporting on 
Form 1099R. The pensioner may request withholding at the source. We 
recommend that all taxable pension payments be subject to a modest 
(say 10 percent) flat rate withholding tax with the pensioner having 
two options:
1. Withholding at a higher rate
41
2. Exemption from withholding if it can reasonably be expected 
that no tax will be due
Currency Reform
There is another long-range approach that we have not seen 
discussed anywhere else. Although it is removed from the tax arena, 
intuitively it would seem to be worthy of consideration as a possible 
deterrent to the underground economy. The vast majority of transac­
tions in the underground economy, other than bartering, are conducted 
with cash. In the modern world of computers and other electronic 
devices, there have been suggestions from time to time that modern 
technology may eliminate the need for cash. Credit cards, electronic 
fund transfers, paying bills by telephone, and shopping via cable 
television have all been suggested as the "wave of the future." It 
might be worthwhile for the government to take steps to encourage 
those developments and hasten the day when we might need little or no 
currency in circulation.
An experiment along these lines that the government might try in 
the near future would be to withdraw from circulation all bills larger 
than the $50 bill. In a widespread but completely unscientific survey 
of people in the business community, we have found no evidence that 
any legitimate Economic activity would be seriously disrupted if there 
were no $100 bills in circulation. Yet, the number of $100 bills in 
circulation has increased far more rapidly than any other denomina­
tion. If it can be presumed that most of these bills find their way 
into both the informal and the illegal segments of the underground 
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economy, the absence of such currency could be a deterrent to those 
activities. If it is deemed necessary or desirable to have $100 bills 
in our currency system, an approach used in Switzerland might be used 
to produce some of the same benefits. Under the Swiss system the $100 
bills, and perhaps the $50 bills, would expire periodically. Anyone 
holding such currency would be required to exchange it at a bank. 
Miscellaneous suggestions
The following are additional suggestions that should be 
considered:
o States should be required to withhold from payments to lot­
tery winners above a reasonable threshold. 
o Tax deductions should be denied for cash payments (other than 
W-2 type wages) above a reasonable threshold.
o Reporting of capital expenditures, including additions to the 
basis of residential or other property, should be mandatory.
o Deduction for the cost of incentives or prizes should be 
denied if the value is not included in a Form 1099 (such as 
the prizes awarded to customers who open new accounts).
o Questions could be added to the individual 1040, Schedule C 
regarding any bartering or currency transactions.
Educational Programs
Some individuals may underreport income simply because they do 
not understand that the income should be reported. In addition, even 
those individuals who know they are underreporting may not understand 
all the potential consequences to themselves or to society.
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Educational programs might be as effective as major increases in 
enforcement activities and would very likely be more acceptable to 
society.
The government should increase its education efforts. A con­
certed effort should be made to counter the negative publicity given 
the underground economy. More publicity should be given to the number 
of returns filed, the amount of tax paid, and the relatively high 
level of voluntary compliance. The IRS should better publicize its 
enforcement activities and the results thereof. Instructions for the 
various tax returns, as well as releases to the popular media, could 
be used to explain that bartering and currency transactions are to be 
reported. Special efforts could be directed at those groups more 
likely to be noncompliers.
It is highly unlikely, however, that government educational 
programs alone will be sufficient. Statements from the government are 
often considered to be self-serving and are viewed by many citizens 
with a great deal of skepticism. Any effort to modify society's views 
toward the tax system and toward responsibilities to society and to 
government would be far more effective if it were sponsored by groups 
outside the government. Such an effort would indeed be a major under­
taking, requiring the resources of many groups, and it would be far 
more effective if it were a cooperative venture involving a wide 
variety of different types of organizations. For maximum exposure and 
impact, the program should be cosponsored by professional organiza­
tions, trade associations, labor groups, and civic organizations.
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Such an educational program should utilize all media and should - 
emphasize such points as—
o The present voluntary compliance system is valuable and 
should be preserved.
o The large majority of taxpayers do pay their tax.
o Most so-called loopholes are really incentives approved by 
Congress to improve our economic or social structures.
o The typical underground transactions are indeed taxable, 
should be reported, and are reported by most taxpayers.
o The possible consequences of participating in the underground 
economy include both personal risks and institutional con­
sequences of excessive government enforcement.
o We cannot "cheat the government"; any underpayment simply 
adds to the burden of fellow citizens.
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